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An important goal of government intervention in credit markets has been to improve 
access to credit for lower-income individuals.  In an effort to provide equal opportunity to access 
for credit, the government implemented two policies with objectives designed at making lending 
more affordable.  Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), which were initially established in 
1916, encourage mortgage activity in secondary mortgage markets, but it wasn’t until the Clinton 
Administration that the GSEs were given affordable lending goals targeting low-income areas.   
The GSEs, currently Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are privately owned but publicly chartered; 
being labeled as GSEs gives these agencies the  illusion of reliability because of the apparent 
government endorsement, giving them a possible competitive edge in the secondary market. 
Conversely, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was initially established in 1977 and 
designed to make lending more accessible to low income areas and increase access to credit in 
the primary market, specifically for low-to-moderate income areas.  As part of the CRA, banks 
form pledges with community groups creating lending goals for the neighborhood; this typically 
involves a pledge amount to target groups currently being underserved (National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition, 2007).   However, over the years the reinforcement of the CRA has been 
progressively stricter especially with the changes made by the Clinton administration simplifying 
of the evaluation system and strengthening the reward system.    
Due to their focus on lending to low-to-moderate income areas, mortgage credit policies 
have been called into question in recent years; initially they were blamed for causing the housing 
crash by giving out loans people could not pay back.  The literature, however, provides 
substantial evidence to the implausibility of this theory, demonstrating that neither policy largely 
contributed to the housing bubble.  Avery, Bostic, and Canner (2000) finds that there are not 
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higher rates of default due to the CRA credit lending, possibly due to an emphasis by the 
regulatory examiners on safe and sound practices under CRA. Nevertheless, critics still question 
if the impact of CRA is worth the dedication of regulatory resources and it is important to 
consider what the effects of mortgage credit policies are on neighborhoods and individuals. 
There has been shown to be an increase in the mortgage supply in underserved areas, but 
not much past research has delved into the subsequent effects on other outcomes due to the 
increase in mortgage supply in these neighborhoods (Bhutta, 2008; Gabriel & Rosenthal, 2008; 
Bostic & Surrette, 2004).  Primarily, past literature examines the effect of Government 
Sponsored Enterprises on community outcomes (An, Bostic, Deng, & Gabriel, 2007; Bostic & 
Gabriel, 2006; Gabriel & Rosenthal, 2008).  Overall it is difficult to parse out what is the actual 
effect of the housing policies on the community outcome variables.  With two housing policies it 
is important to keep the effects of each policy on the community outcome variables separate.  
Technological advances have made giving credit access to lower-income areas easier. 
Characteristics in the neighborhoods vary based in conjunction with characteristics that might 
influence if neighborhoods would be loaned to or not; therefore, it is important to keep the 
impact of the policy separate from alternative reasons for the increase in mortgage credit (Avery, 
Canner, & Calem, 2003).  Some research has attempted to examine some of the impact of the 
CRA on community outcome variables, specifically homeownership, but researchers have not 
exploited the potential for a regression discontinuity to isolate the effect of CRA and the 
mortgage credit increase.   
In this paper, I examine the effects of CRA increasing the availability of mortgage credit 
on low-income neighborhoods in two stages.  Due to the stronger support in the literature of a 
significant increase in the mortgage supply, I focus on the CRA policy rather than the GSE 
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affordable lending goals in order to better examine the effect of the mortgage increase on 
community outcomes.   CRA regulators use an eligibility cutoff determined by the income of the 
neighborhood as a ratio of the income of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) to distinguish 
which neighborhoods are underserved.  I first use these discontinuous cutoffs in each of the 
housing goals to look at the effects of the policies on the mortgage volume supplied. The Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data provides micro-data comprised of home purchase, 
refinance, and home improvement mortgage applications spanning from 1990 to the present.  
The Geolytics decennial census data from 1990 provides the income variables used to indicate 
the target neighborhoods and the demographic variables.  I find an estimate effect of CRA on the 
number of originations in marginally treated tracts to be between a 1.7% -1.9% increase for all 
MSAs and a 5.4%-5.7% significant increase in large MSA   
I exploit the CRA cutoff to look at the effects of CRA on community outcome variables 
from the 2000 Census, specifically homeownership, home values, mobility, educational 
attainment, and employment factors.  To estimate the effect of the increase in mortgage credit 
caused by the housing policy on these factors, I scale the reduced form estimate by the estimated 
effect of CRA on log of originations.  I find little evidence of significant change in the main 
community outcome variables of homeownership, home values, and mobility rate when full 
specifications are included. I find a marginally significant change in commuting time and college 
education, but all other factors are small and insignificant. 
In the next section, I will outline the government policy goals more in depth and 
summarize what has already been examined in the previous literature.  Subsequently I will 
provide further information regarding the data sources and the summary statistics.  I will outline 
my empirical strategy for analyzing the first and second stages of the key question, followed by 
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the results section with robustness checks.  Finally, the discussion and conclusion section will 
examine the implications of the housing policies and offer further areas that should be explored 
in regards to analyzing the effects of the CRA on the targeted communities. 
II. Background 
 In conjunction with a set of housing policies passed in 1977, the Community 
Reinvestment Act was created to increase credit opportunity to low-to-moderate income areas or 
high minority areas in particular; the avoidance of these areas was called redlining after the red 
outline that was used to indicate them as high risk areas in maps of targeted areas for investment 
(Federal regulation, 2003; Berry & Lee, 2007).  Informational barriers existed in these areas 
caused by the diverse population that lived in the neighborhoods, which lead to investors 
avoiding an area altogether for fear of making a higher proportion of high risk loans.    CRA was 
established to eliminate the first mover problem by creating incentives for investors to lend in 
targeted areas.  In a recent paper, Bhutta found that CRA did lead to crowd-in of non-CRA 
mortgage lenders into the neighborhoods targeted by CRA (Bhutta, 2008). Institutions not 
obligated to loan in the targeted areas have increased investment in low-to-moderate income 
areas over time suggesting that there were initial informational barriers and that there was a 
benefit to lending in the low-to-moderate income areas.    
 CRA applies to all banks and thrifts insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) (Office of the Comptroller of Currency, 2011).  The government left certain 
parameters of CRA lending up to the discretion of the institutions.  In addition to allowing the 
institutions to make loans of any size, either conforming or non-conforming, the lending goals 
for the institution are set via a pledge system usually created with the help of a local community 
group.  The government wanted to assure that the banks and thrifts were meeting the needs of the 
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individual neighborhoods (Avery, Canner, & Calem, 2003).  Though the pledges can be focused 
on a variety of factors, including lending for single family and multifamily home mortgages, 
non-profit and minority housing developers, and small business owners, the institutions are 
required to focus efforts towards low-to-moderate income (LMI) neighborhoods (National 
Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2007).  These neighborhoods are defined as census tracts 
whose median family income is equal to and above 50% but less than 80% of the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) median income (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2010).   
These LMI neighborhoods need to be in the assessment area, which is defined as counties 
and cities within the MSA where the bank or thrift branch is located.  The banks and thrifts are 
evaluated by their respective regulatory institutions.  Initially a complex number system was 
established to provide the institutions with their performance rating.  If a bank does not achieve 
the necessary rating to meet CRA standards, the regulators can deny bank mergers, new 
branches, and charters for deposit insurance (Office of the Comptroller of Currency, 2011). 
Initially, the communities were unable to gain access to this information to effectively evaluate 
their local institutions, despite the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), a policy aimed at 
making lending data more accessible to borrowers, being passed in the same year as CRA 
(Avery, Canner, & Calem, 2003).  
 CRA, when first created, had very little strength.  There was a limit on interstate and 
occasionally intrastate branching.  Therefore, there were restrictions on the size and magnitude 
of both expansion and mergers.  Furthermore, the different regulatory agencies did not reinforce 
the threat to prohibit charters from being passed or mergers from happening based on a CRA 
score.  In 1989, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) 
was passed requiring the regulators to disclose the CRA performance ratings to the public.  The 
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first denial of a merger due to CRA was in 1989 directly after FIRREA was implemented (Berry 
& Lee, 2007).  Regulators designed a simplified evaluation only involving a four-tier rating 
system: substantial non-compliance, needs improvement, satisfactory, and outstanding. 
Furthermore, FIERRA also expanded the amount of information collected as part of HMDA and 
drastically improved communities’ ability to attain HMDA data to evaluate CRA themselves and 
keep regulators in check (Berry & Lee, 2007).  Community watch dog groups now could more 
effectively monitor the actions of their local institutions that fell under CRA regulation. 
 The Clinton administration strengthened CRA further, putting pressure on policy makers 
starting in 1993.  Changes were not made to CRA itself until 1995, but in 1994 the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) allowed interstate mergers.  IBBEA 
strengthened incentives for institutions to follow CRA rules.  For fear of devaluing CRA 
incentives, such as deposit insurance, the CRA has not yet fully expanded to encompass 
independent mortgage companies despite the 1999 Gramm-Leach Baily Act where banking 
institutions could take over mortgage companies.  Further motivating incentives in the 1995 
change, a more uniform performance evaluation system was established.  A three-part test was 
created for the regulator examinations involved: test of lending, investment, and services.  Each 
section in the three-part test receives a rating.  The lending test is 50% of the entire CRA credit 
test.  Therefore, an institution cannot receive an outstanding or satisfactory if they receive less 
than a satisfactory on their lending test.  The new evaluation system makes the objective of the 
institutions CRA lending goals much clearer.  
 When evaluating the effectiveness of CRA, there are some components of the policy that 
can complicate regression analysis.  Under the CRA, institutions are able to loan out of their 
MSA and shift to include an area “reasonably expected to be served”.  It must include the whole 
9 
 
geographic area, not just the LMI census tracts.  It is difficult to pinpoint which areas outside the 
assessment area are included in the scope of lending areas under CRA for each institution.  
Furthermore, because there are four different regulatory bodies monitoring the institution’s CRA 
behavior, there are differences in ratings based on which regulatory body is evaluating the 
institution.  The lack of consistency across institutions’ ratings could mean that all institutions 
that fall under CRA do not feel the same pressure to participate, making the effect of the policy 
inconsistent and more difficult to generalize.  
Several studies summarize the amount of lending to neighborhoods by type of loan.  The 
Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS) found that overall home purchase loans to LMI 
neighborhoods increased by 77% while there was only a 53% increase overall in home purchase 
loans (Berry & Lee, 2007).  However, it is important to decipher what is due to CRA and what 
could be due to other factors.  
Some previous literature finds tries to look at effect of CRA looking indirectly at its 
effects on the mortgage supply. Avery, Canner, and Calem (2003) compare the market share 
institutions with outstanding and satisfactory CRA ratings during 1993-1999 above and below 
the 80% cutoff.  These outstanding institutions had 0.37 points higher lending rate in the CRA-
eligible group than in the not CRA-eligible areas, but for satisfactory institutions they find a 
higher lending rate for not CRA-eligible institutions.  Additionally, the researchers state that 
CRA-covered institutions’ market shares are the highest where CRA-eligible cohorts’ 
performance is the poorest.  This indicates that the neighborhoods in which CRA institutions are 
most prevalent is where the institutions are least effective.  Only the outstanding CRA rated 
institutions perform well in locations where they hold a high market share.  It is never stated, 
however, on what the researchers are gauging CRA-eligible cohort performance.  The analysis 
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conducted by Avery et al focuses only on the effectiveness of the CRA institutions which do not 
necessarily reflect the effect of the CRA overall.  Berry and Lee (2007) use a linear probability 
model to examine the rejection rate above and below the cutoff.  They find that the rejection rate 
is lower for banks operating in their assessment area, but this is not due to CRA because the 
rejections rates are not especially lower for LMI loans.  This makes an important statement that 
any increase in originations for LMI loans is an increase in number of loans made not simply 
because the application rate increased in one area which would lead to more rejections as well as 
loans.  However, it is critical to look directly at the effects of CRA on its intended target, the 
mortgage volume of low-to-moderate income areas. 
Research finds a significant positive effect when looking directly at CRA impact on the 
mortgage volume.  Bostic and Surrette (2004) use lender-county combinations in a series of four 
two-year panels to examine the impact of county eligibility on the originations by a lender in that 
area.  The results show a positive and significant effect of CRA on lending in the CRA-eligible 
counties.  Each county, however, may or may not be CRA eligible but rather each census tract is 
measured to be CRA-eligible or not.  Through a regression discontinuity at the census tracts 
level, Gabriel and Rosenthal (2008) examine CRA impact on conforming and non-conforming 
loans.  For the full sample, the researchers found that CRA leads to a positive increase in number 
of originations in the treated area.  When the window around the cutoff, for which they use the 
80% CRA eligibility cutoff is limited to 10 or 5 percentage points, Gabriel and Rosenthal find 
that CRA has a negative or insignificant effect on number of conforming loans, respectively.  
The effect of CRA on non-conforming loans remains positive and significant no matter the size 
of the window.  These results may suggest that CRA either at most only increases the number of 
loans with a larger dollar amount in marginally treated tracts if not decreasing the number loans 
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with a smaller dollar amount.  Gabriel and Rosenthal, however, use only county fixed effects 
thus limiting the variation especially in rural areas and do not allow their regression to vary with 
the tract to MSA median income (TM) variable, thereby forcing it to fit a linear model with a flat 
slope.    
Bhutta (2008) uses more modern regression discontinuity techniques and conducts a local 
linear regression discontinuity on the effect of the CRA on all loans.  Bhutta found a 3% increase 
overall in the number of loans originated from the years 1994-2002.  Additionally, he broke the 
data down by sets of years; between 1994-1996 there was a 4% increase in mortgage supply for 
CRA eligible areas while in the years 1997-2002 there was an 8% increase.  The cause of this 
difference is that after 1997, the CRA guidelines were more strictly enforced.  Additionally, 
Bhutta finds that there is the most impact in large MSAs.  He suggests that this may be due to 
several factors.  Large MSAs garner the most attention from the regulators therefore these areas 
with CRA punishments are most enforced.  Furthermore, there may be more motivation in these 
areas due to the opportunity for expansion and mergers increasing incentives (Bhutta, 2008).  
Another possibility that Bhutta does not consider is the potential for sampling error in small and 
medium MSAs.  Just examining the MSA that the lender is in may not be enough; because 
lenders are able to lend outside of their initial assessment area if the regulators deem it fit, those 
lenders in the smaller areas are more likely to be allowed to lend outside of their MSA.  This 
policy may allow the lenders to have fewer originations over more census tracts instead of 
focusing efforts on fewer targeted communities.  Overall, it is suggested that the CRA has a 
causal effect on the number of loans originated in underserved areas; due to the variation in 
previous literature, I verify the increase in mortgage supply in underserved areas.   
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Some community outcome variables have been explored more in depth than others.  
Homeownership is one of the main outcome variables expected to be impacted by the increase in 
mortgage originations in an area.  Homeownership is a crucial variable to consider; it is believed 
that homeownership may lead to investment in local amenities and social capital because it 
creates barriers to mobility and subsequently provides an incentive to invest in the improvement 
of the neighborhood (DiPasquale and Glaser, 1996).  Past literature finds mixed results regarding 
the impact of CRA on homeownership rates.  Barr (2005) finds that the CRA leads to an increase 
in low-income and moderate-income areas for minority individuals.  Gabriel and Rosenthal 
(2008) using an regression discontinuity found a significant negative effect of the CRA on 
homeownership in a large bin around the mean but when the sample was limited to a 10 and 5 
percentage point window around the mean the results became positive but insignificant.  Avery 
et al. (2003) finds a significant increase in homeownership around the cutoff in CRA-eligible 
tracts but they do not attribute it to CRA because in the CRA-eligible tracts where 
homeownership is the higher, performance of CRA institutions are poorer.  I look at the 
homeownership rate in a modern regression discontinuity format. Additionally, I scale it by the 
effect found on the mortgage supply to view the relationship between the two.   
House prices have also been studied, but not as extensively. House prices are expected to 
change more dramatically with a mortgage supply increase in areas with an inelastic housing 
market than areas with a more elastic housing growth (Mian & Sufi, 2010).  For low-to-moderate 
income neighborhoods the lower housing growth in these areas is expected to be more inelastic. 
Researchers use median self-reported home values from the census as a possible proxy for house 
prices trying to examine if the stock of housing market is increasing or decreasing in value.  
Avery et al. find that there is a significantly lower growth of the median home values in CRA-
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eligible cohorts.  Again, however, like homeownership, they do not attribute this significant 
effect to CRA (Avery et al., 2003).  Due to the minimal literature, I will also examine the effects 
of CRA and the increase in mortgage supply on the self-reported median home values.   
Mobility is an important factor not yet considered quantitatively in the literature that can 
influence other more individual centric factors, such as employment and educational attainment.  
It is important to identify if the same people are living in the tract or if the increase in mortgage 
supply is bringing in a different set of people.  An increase in mobility would indicate tract 
turnover; conversely, a decrease in mobility would indicate that individuals are staying in the 
tract longer.  When paired with an increase in homeownership, a decrease in mobility could be 
an indication that new homeowners are new residents.  Other outcome variables can be 
influenced by a change in mobility.  Andrew Oswald (1996) describes how a decline in the 
mobility rates from an increase in homeownership leads to a decrease in employment.  When 
individuals are invested and now tied to their homes, it makes it more difficult for the individual 
to move to a new city to find employment.  It is possible then that an increase in mortgage supply 
in low-income areas could be detrimental to employment.  If the individual is a homeowner, they 
might be barred from leaving an area for a promotion and they will see a stagnation or decline in 
their wages.  Alternatively, an individual might more actively seek out a job with higher wages 
to pay off the mortgage.  Finally, mobility can be examined in conjunction with the educational 
attainment of the adult population in a tract.  Whether an individual stays in a tract might be 
contingent on their educational attainment.  Tract characteristics are possibly influenced by an 
increase in mortgage lending in previous years; I look to add to the literature which lacks 





To examine the effects of CRA on the mortgage credit supply, I use a regression 
discontinuity to exploit the CRA eligibility rule.  A reduced form regression for each of the 
community outcome variables is later scaled by the effect of CRA on log number of originations.  
A regression discontinuity provides a quasi-experimental analysis of the outcome variable 
around the eligibility cutoff.  Under the continuity assumption that all characteristics of the tracts 
were treated or none were treated, all tracts would vary smoothly across the cutoff; the eligibility 
cutoff is arbitrary and should not lead to significant differences of the characteristics of tracts 
above and below the cutoff.  Therefore, a regression discontinuity should isolate the effects of 
the program on the key variables of interest.  The eligibility rule for tracts under CRA is 
determined by the ratio of a tract’s family median income to MSA median income (TM).  Banks 
and thrifts under CRA target low-to-moderate income tracts which are defined as having their 
median family income at least 50% but no more than 80% of the MSA median income.  The 
impact of CRA would be indicated by a jump in the outcome variable at the 80% income ratio 
cutoff. 
 For my cutoff identifier variable, I use the same tract to MSA median income ratio that 
banks and thrifts use to identify the eligibility cutoff.  Bank regulators use the decennial census 
to identify the median income of the tracts and MSAs.  Because I am looking at a range from 
1994-1999, I use the 1990 decennial census data to determine the MSA and tract median 
incomes. The MSA boundaries were update in 1993; therefore I use these 1993 MSA definitions 
from the census website and mapped them onto the 1990 decennial census data via county and 
state information. There was difficulty applying the 1993 MSA definitions for New England. 
New England is mapped into towns instead of counties and I did not have the mapping of census 
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tracts to towns for the 1993 MSA definitions.  Any town that was in a different MSA in 1990 and 
1993 was dropped from the data set.   
 I use the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data to provide me with the key 
outcome variable for measuring the mortgage volume at the census tract level. Since 1990, 
HMDA compiles lending activity from the lenders it covers.  In 1993, the number of independent 
mortgage companies required to submit information expanded.  Independent banks, however, 
with less that $30 million in assets are still not required to report to HMDA.  Bhutta (2008) 
found that these only make up 1.6% of all 1-4 family residential loans held by all banks in a 
MSA at the end of 1998.  In particular, I use the HMDA data from 1994-1999.  By 1994, the data 
is cleaner and includes a larger number of institutions.  Additionally, effects of some of the other 
lending are possibly captured in the amount of lending by CRA institutions.  I only look at 
mortgage data up to 1999 in order to limit my data to a range of years that could possibly affect 
the community outcome variables taken in the 2000 Census. 
Census tract characteristics are taken from the 1990 and 2000 decennial census from the 
Neighborhood Change Database provided by the Geolytics Corporation.  The control 
characteristics are taken from the 1990 census, while the second stage outcome variables are 
taken from the 2000 decennial census.  From the 1990 to 2000 census, some tract boundaries are 
redefined.  To keep a consistent sample of tracts across the first and second stages, I drop all 
tracts that change boundaries.  Table 1 provides a comparison between the full sample and the 
sample of tracts that do not change boundaries from the 1990 to 2000 census.  Both samples are 
only looking at a bandwidth within 0.3 TM of the 0.8 CRA cutoff variables. 
The tracts whose boundaries were unchanged were similar to the full sample of census 
tracts.  The 1990 census characteristics are at most 14% different other than the proportion of 
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houses built between 1980 and 1990 and the proportion of mobile trailer homes.  The unchanged 
tracts were 26% less likely to have mobile homes; these tracts were more likely to have houses 
built before 1970 and therefore have an older housing stock.  The unchanged tracts have a 
smaller population, less total housing units and less owner occupied units.  The median house 
value is greater than the full sample and there is a higher proportion of multifamily units but a 
lower proportion living in group quarters.  In unchanged tracts, there is a higher proportion of 
non-Hispanic Black/African American population and an almost equivalent proportion of 
Hispanic/Latino population.  There is a slightly higher proportion of elderly persons in the 
unchanged tract.  Overall, the homes in the unchanged tract are older, there are more multifamily 
homes, fewer mobile homes, and there are a higher proportion of black and elderly persons but 
slightly lower proportion of Hispanic individuals.  
Additional restrictions are placed on the data due to underreporting and possible 
characteristics that may distort the data.  I exclude MSAs in Hawaii and Alaska due to 
underreporting.  I drop census tracts with less than 100 housing units; rural areas are under-
reported due to fewer assets lent. This restriction brings the focus more towards cities.  Similarly, 
I drop all tracts that do not have at least one owner occupied unit.  Due to a desire to focus on 
individuals eligible for loans, I drop the tracts where more than 30% of the population is in group 
quarters to avoid heavily prison oriented tracts.  These restrictions were modeled after the 
restrictions set forth in Bhutta (2008). 
Comparing the census tracts in wide 30% bandwidths above and below the cutoff reveals 
systematic differences.  All the census characteristics above and below are significantly different.  
The census tracts below the cutoff have fewer total housing, fewer owner occupied units, and a 
lower median house value.  There are a higher proportion of multifamily homes in the tracts 
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below the CRA cutoff.  Furthermore, this housing stock is more likely built before 1940.  The 
residents are less likely to be non-Hispanic Black/African Americans but more likely to be 
Hispanic/Latino.  There is a slightly smaller proportion of elderly residents and a slightly larger 
proportion of individuals living in group quarters.  These are the differences to be expected 
comparing low-income and high-income areas. 
To examine the effects of CRA, three types of loans are examined together: home 
purchase loans, home improvement loans, and refinance loans.  The average number of 
originations, for years 1994 through 1999, varies with the median income of the census tract.  
Tracts above the cutoff have 42% more home purchase originations per year and 39% more 
combined refinance and home improvement loans per year than those tracts below the cutoff.  
The log of total originations, including all three types of originations, for a tract is the key 
outcome variable to examine the effects of CRA on the mortgage credit in targeted areas; the 
originations are allowed to vary on a logarithmic scale due to the expected growth of originations 
across the income variable.  This transfiguration captures the total number of originations for a 
tract summed over the years 1994-1999.  Again, above the cutoff, the log of originations is 
significantly greater than for the tracts below the cutoff.  Due to the systematic differences in the 
tracts above and below the cutoff, a more detailed statistical analysis is required to determine the 
effects of CRA lending.   
 In addition to the log of originations, I look at the log of the dollar amount originated and 
the log of the average dollar amount per originations.  These factors are vital to obtaining the full 
picture of mortgage volume.  Both amount and number of originations are targets of the CRA. It 
is important to see if the number originations increase but the value per origination decreases 
making the total amount lent to the tract the same or less than if the tract is untreated.  The full 
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sample and unchanged tract sample are very similar to each other.  Consistent with the log of 
originations, the log of the dollar amount originated is significantly lower below the cut off as 
well as the average dollar amount per origination.   
The community outcome variables are taken from the 2000 Geolytics census data. To 
examine the homeownership rate, I scale the number of owner occupied units by the number of 
occupied housing units in a tract.  For the unchanged census tract about half of occupied housing 
units are owner occupied therefore the homeownership rate is around 49.4%.  To examine the 
house prices for a tract, I use the log of the self-reported median home values from the census.  
The mobility rate is measured using the proportion of individuals age 5 and above who live in a 
different house 5 years ago.  This variable examines the degree of turnover in a neighborhood.  
In unchanged tracts about 48.7% of the population lived in a different house 5 years ago.  The 
employment rate looks at the total number of civilians who are employed out of the total civilian 
population of individuals age 16 and above.  The armed forces are separated from the 
employment variables in the census in an attempt to look at the state of the free job market; 
54.4% of all civilians over the age of 16 are employed.  The unemployment rate is the proportion 
of the civilian labor force that identifies as in the labor force and unemployed.  In unchanged 
tracts, 9.6% of the civilian labor force is unemployed.  The labor force participation rate is the 
number of civilians above the age of 16 who classify themselves as in the labor force out of the 
total population of civilians.  59.9% of the total population of civilians qualifies themselves as in 
the labor force. The commuting time of individuals is examined if the commute took less than 25 
minutes and the individual does not work at home out of all employed individuals.  For those 
who do not work at home, 30.6% of the working population commutes to work in less than 25 
minutes.  While the proportion of individuals above the age of 25 with a high school diploma is 
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29.8%, the proportion of individuals with a college degree (Bachelors or above) above the age of 
25 is 14.1%.   
There are further systematic differences between the tract characteristics from the 2000 
census above and below the cutoff.  Above the cutoff, there is a high homeownership rate and 
median home values but lower mobility.  As expected in high median income areas. there is a 
higher employment rate, lower unemployment rate, and high labor force participation rate; 
additionally, there are higher proportion of employed individuals who commute less than 25 
minutes.  In the tracts above the cutoff there are a higher proportion of individuals with both a 
high school diploma and a college degree.  Again, though it is apparent there are systematic 
differences above and below the CRA cutoff, a more thorough analysis is needed to assess the 
effects of CRA on these tract characteristics and, furthermore, what the effect of a possible 
increase in mortgage lending has on these community outcome variables.   
IV. Empirical Strategy 
The main strategy used to look at the effects of CRA on the mortgage volume (as 
measured by log of originations) and community outcomes is a regression discontinuity.  First let 
Y1i be the tract outcome (e.g. log of origination) for some tract i if the tract is treated by CRA 
and let Y0i be the tract outcome for some tract i if the tract is not treated CRA.  We want to know 
the effect of Y1i – Y0i.  However, we do not observe both the Y1i and Y0i for the same tract.  If we 
let Di=1[TMi<.80] then we observe: 
(1)     Yi=ቄY1i	if	Di ൌ 1Y0i	if	Di ൌ 0 
In a regression discontinuity to identify the average treatment effect we must have the continuity 
assumption that the outcome variables would be continuous in the counterfactual situation 
without the CRA treatment.  Therefore if we assume that: 
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 (2)   E[Y1i|TM=x] and E[Y0i|TM=x] are continuous at x=0.8 
The tract at TMi is 0.8 would be continuous with the tract at immediately below 0.8 if it were not 
for the CRA treatment.  The tracts directly above and below the cutoff should be exactly the 
same with the exception of their treatment status under CRA.  Therefore, any differences in these 
tracts should be due to their CRA treatment.  If the characteristics of the tracts are assumed to be 
continuous at the cutoff there should be no other factors that would be changing discontinuously 
at the cutoff leaving only the treatment effect due to CRA captured.   Thus, we are able to 
estimate the treatment of CRA at the cutoff of E[Y1i - Y0i |TM=.8], as: 
(3)    lim୶↑଴.଼ 	Eሾ ௜ܻ|X ൌ xሿ െ	 lim୶↓଴.଼ Eሾ ௜ܻ|X ൌ xሿ 
This estimates the average treatment effect on the marginal census tract around the cutoff.  
In practice, to estimate this treatment effect my main specific regression to find the effect of 
CRA is: 
(4)  Yi = β0 + β1Di + β2TMi + β3TMi2 + β4 TMi3 + λXi + εi 
β1 is the CRA treatment effect for marginal tracts and the Xi is a vector of controls.  TMi is the 
running variable allowing the slope to vary across the median income ratio. Included in the 
controls is the cutoff for the Government Sponsored Enterprises at 0.90 TM.  My main 
specification includes the cubic regression for a 0.3 bandwidth around the cutoff of 0.8.  
However, also shown in the results are a linear regression and a smaller bandwidth of 0.05. 
Additionally, estimates are made both with and without MSA fixed effects.  Due to the nature of 
CRA, fixed effects are preferred because the lenders target local communities within their 
assessment area.   
 For the community outcome variables, both a reduced form and a two stage least squares 
regression is conducted.  It is the aim to capture both the direct effect of the CRA program on 
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each of the community outcome variables and the effect on each of these variables of an increase 
in the mortgage credit due to the CRA program. The reduced form regression of each of the 
community outcome variables captures the expected effect of the CRA program on the 
individual variables.  The jump in the outcome variable due to the CRA treatment is estimated 
using equation (4).  In practice, in the marginal treated tracts the effect of the increase of 
originations due to CRA is estimated using the treatment term as an instrumental variable for log 
of originations in a two stage least squares; therefore, the reduced form of the community 
outcome variable is scaled by the treatment effect of CRA on the volume of mortgage lending. 
Using equation (3), if Oi signifies the mortgage outcome variable of log of originations and Ci as 
the community outcome variables this treatment effect can be written as:  
(5) 
lim୶↑଴.଼ 	Eሾܥ௜|X ൌ xሿ െ	 lim୶↓଴.଼ Eሾܥ௜|X ൌ xሿ
lim୶↑଴.଼ 	Eሾ ௜ܱ|X ൌ xሿ െ	 lim୶↓଴.଼ Eሾ ௜ܱ|X ൌ xሿ
 
In other words, this is the effect of an increase in the number of originations on the community 
outcome variables.  This captures the effect of the outcome variable targeted by CRA, mortgage 
originations, on other potential outcome variables in the marginal census tracts around the cutoff. 
V. Results 
Robustness Check 
 If pre-treatment tract characteristics vary continuously across the cutoff, then it supports 
our assumption that the outcome variable would otherwise continue continuously across the 
cutoff.  The pre-treatment tract characteristics used are the tract characteristics from the 1990 
census.  These tract characteristics not only characterized a tract before CRA enforcement 
became more stringent, but in each decennial census, the regulators reassign a new TM variable 
to a tract.  Those tracts that were treated by CRA before 1990 were not necessarily the same 
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tracts treated by CRA after 1990.  The reassignment allows us to treat 1990 census tract 
characteristics as a pre-treatment for the 1994-1999 year range.  
It is important to demonstrates that all pre-treatment characteristics vary continuously 
across the cutoff to be able to isolate the CRA as the only factor that influences the tracts at that 
cutoff point.  As laid out by Bhutta (2008), Figure 1 plots the predicted values of the log of total 
number of originations between a TM 0.5 and 1.10 between the years of 1994-1999.  The 
predicted value of the log of originations is based on a regression of the log of originations on the 
1990 tract characteristics from the census, not including the TM variable, the CRA cutoff or GSE 
cutoff.  The variation in these characteristics explains 72.5% of the variation in the log of 
originations. A cubic regression of the predicted value on the CRA dummy variable without 
MSA fixed effects indicated an estimated discontinuity of 5.6% increase in log of originations, 
though this difference is insignificant.  Therefore, the pre-treatment characteristics appear not to 
exhibit a significant discontinuity change at the cutoff.  This confirms for this set of years (1994-
1999) the results that Bhutta found for the years 1994-2002.   
Regressions on Mortgage Volume 
The regression results of the effect of CRA on the mortgage volume (as measured 
through log of the number of originations) can be found in Table 2 A and Table 2 B.  Table 2 A 
shows the initial regression results using the full sample, whereas Table 2 B explicitly sets out  
the unchanged tracts.  Consistent with Bhutta’s (2008) regressions, no significant effect is found 
in any other sample of data other than in the large MSA. The medium MSAs, for the full sample, 
show a significant difference in mortgage originations when the bandwidth is small with a linear 
regression without controls; this effect, however, disappears when the bandwidth is expanded 
and the regression is cubic and includes controls.  As Bhutta suggests, large MSAs are more 
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likely to have a stricter punishment because regulators would target large cities to conserve 
resources.  Furthermore, small banks can use CRA as good publicity to make themselves more 
appealing to larger companies.  Any bank looking to partake in merging activity or expansion 
activity needs to follow CRA guidelines; both of these activities may be more likely to occur in 
larger MSAs due to more opportunity to expand or take over smaller banks.   
In the full sample, the very basic linear equations with no controls in a small area around 
the cutoff reveal no significant changes in log of originations due to CRA (Table 2a).  Though 
not significant, the linear regression within 5 percentage points of the cutoff reflects 11% greater 
originations in CRA treated tracts at the margin.  In the wider bin width, with and without 
controls the large MSAs reflect a significant change due to CRA in marginally treated tracts.  For 
linear regression that is around a 3.87% increase in originations.  For the polynomial 
relationship, without controls there is around a 9.4% increase in originations (see Figure 2), but 
with the full set of controls there is a 5.73% increase in the number of originations.   
The unchanged tracts reflect similar results.  Across most of the regressions for the large 
MSAs there is a significant increase in the percent change of originations (Table 2b).  The 
change in originations due to the tract being treated for CRA right around the cutoff is 19.9%.  
Figure 3 shows the cubic regression in a wider bin width from column 5, with no controls or 
fixed effects; this graph show there is a 13.6% jump in log originations at the cutoff.  In the 
wider bin width, a polynomial regression with controls suggests that there is a 5.45% effect of 
the treatment of CRA on these marginal treated tracts.  This percentage increase is the key 
treatment coefficient for originations capturing the effect of CRA on its directly targeted 
outcome, number of originations. Therefore, in marginal tracts at the CRA cutoff, assumed and 
found to be similar on either side of the cutoff, there are 5.45% more originations in marginally 
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treated tracts than in marginally untreated tracts in large MSAs.  Again fixed effects are preferred 
in order to allow the CRA enforcement and execution to vary across MSAs.  Additionally, the 
controls are useful to control for possible covariates that might confound the results and therefore 
increase precision.   
Looking at the log of the average amount per originations provides evidence that the 
mortgage originations in a CRA treated area are associated with an increase in the total dollar 
volume of mortgage lending.  There is evidence that the dollar amount originated increases by 
around .3% in all tracts treated by CRA, though the effect is not significant, and by a marginally 
significant 6% in large MSAs (Table 3a).  This discontinuity indicates that there is an increase in 
the total dollar amount originated along with the number of originations in each treated tract.  
The average dollar amount per origination in all MSAs decreases slightly but is insignificant; in 
large MSAs there is a non-significant increase of 0.5% in average amount per originations (Table 
3b).  The increase in total dollar amount originated was not associated with a decrease in the 
average amount originated which suggests that there were not a larger number of smaller loans 
which would have kept the total dollar volume approximately the same.  The amount per loan is 
roughly the same in marginally treated tracts as in non-treated tracts, and an increase in the total 
number originations is associated with the total dollar amount originated increasing. 
Regressions on Community Outcome Variables 
Overall there is little strong evidence of an effect of the program on the community 
outcome variables.  In specifications of a full set of controls, only high school degree rate and 
commuting time were significantly impacted, but in comparison to the mean this impact was 
very small.  It is expected that the homeownership rate increases when the number of 
originations increases.  With more originations and a greater access to credit, more people can 
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obtain homes.   Homeownership rate could consequently influence the reduced form of other 
outcome variables.  Homeownership could influence a person’s ability to move for a job thereby 
affecting employment, unemployment, mobility, or commuting time.   The type of people living 
in the neighborhood may be influenced by the homeownership rate in characteristics such as high 
school degree, college degree, or mobility.  Home value may also be influenced by the 
homeownership rate through supply and demand in the market or the investment in the houses.  
No impact of the homeownership rate eliminates a reason to expect reduced form results.  
Though there is small evidence of an effect of homeownership, it is not robust across all 
specifications.  I still examine the effect on community outcome variables of CRA and the 
increase in originations due to CRA despite little evidence indicating a change in 
homeownership rate. In some areas, mobility may also have an impact, but again, because there 
is no discernible impact of CRA on mobility, there is less cause for significant results in the 
reduced form.   Additionally, there was neither a significant nor large impact of the increase of 
originations on most of the community outcomes.  The increase in number of originations did 
show a significant positive moderate increase in the proportion of individuals commuting to 
work in less than 25 minutes.   
Contrary to previous findings, I find only limited evidence for an increase in 
homeownership which is not robust to MSA fixed effects or additional controls. The reduced 
form without MSA fixed effects or any controls shows that the marginal treated tracts have a 
homeownership rate that is significantly 3 percentage points higher (Figure 4).  When the full 
controls are added, the effect diminishes to only a 0.01 percentage point increase in the 49.6% 
rate of owner-occupied units out of occupied housing units due to the effect of CRA (Table 4).  
The expected increase in homeownership rates, though, is due to the increase in the number of 
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originations in the treated groups.  The reduced form scaled by the increase in the number of 
originations for the regression without controls finds and without fixed effects shows that there is 
a significant 0.23 percentage point increase in homeownership rate in marginally treated tracts 
with a 1% increase in originations.  However, when MSA fixed effects are added, that coefficient 
diminishes to 0.14 percentage points, and when full controls are added, there is only a .002 
percentage point increase in homeownership rate with every 1% increase in originations in a 
treated tract.  The lack of increase in homeownership rate across all specifications suggests that 
possibly the more originations obtained are used for purposes other than purchasing new homes.  
Previous literature only uses the total number of owner-occupied units without scaling it by the 
occupied housing units.  This does not account for new construction in the treated areas that 
would have occurred regardless of the treatment.  Furthermore, the number of originations 
includes home purchase loans, home improvement loans, and refinance loans.  It may be that 
there is not an increase in homeownership rate because home improvement loans and refinance 
loans are the bulk of the increase in originations.  If, however, this is the case, it would be 
expected that the value of an individual’s home would increase instead; there is little evidence of 
an effect found in the reported median home values, see below.  The most likely explanation is 
that there was a substitution away from using an individual’s savings for home investments; in 
marginally treated tracts, because loans were easier to obtain, individuals received a loan instead 
of pulling money from their savings.    
The log of median values reported for house prices again is insignificant and very small 
once controls are included.  It is not necessarily expected that house prices would respond 
directly to the tracts being treated by CRA, but it could be expected that either the house prices 
would increase or decrease due to a greater mortgage supply.  The house prices could decrease if 
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a greater supply of mortgages leads to a greater supply of housing.  There could be an increase in 
housing prices with a mortgage volume increase if those already eligible for mortgages received 
greater loans to purchase more housing.  Because I am looking at self-reported home values, an 
increase in certain types of loans can also influence this outcome variable.  Home improvement 
loans are included in the number of originations meaning more originations could lead to a 
higher house value.  However, there is neither a significant or large increase nor decrease of self-
reported home values across any of the variation in controls (Figure 5; Table 5).  Without 
controls, the value of home values appears to be decreasing though with controls there appears to 
be an increase in home values.  A 1% increase in originations only leads to a .02% increase in 
the value of homes in the treated tracts.   
CRA has no significant influence on the mobility of individuals from their household.  
The mobility rate measures the proportion of individuals age 5 and above who lived in a different 
house 5 years ago.  With an increase in mortgage credit in marginal treatment tracts it is possible 
to see a turnover of individuals who live in the tract.  There may not be an increase in 
homeownership, but there may be an increase in mobility changing which individuals live in the 
tract.  Alternatively, there may be a decrease in mobility with more mortgages.  People more able 
to purchase houses would also be able to obtain a loan to improve their house and thus would 
stay instead of moving.   However, neither the reduced form nor the second stage regression 
shows a significant increase or decrease in the mobility rate in marginally treated tracts across all 
specifications (Table 6; Figure 6).  The scaled reduced form with full controls shows that with a 
1% increase in originations, there is a .13 percentage point decrease from the 46.4% mobility 
rate, but this coefficient is not significant and has a fairly wide confidence interval (Table 6).  It 
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does not appear that number of originations offered in an area causes a significant change in the 
make-up of a neighborhood. 
The education variables, however, may suggest that though the mobility rate is the same, 
those who are staying in the marginal tracts have a high education.  It may be expected, despite 
the change in mobility rate, that there would be a compositional change in who over the age of 
25 with a high school degree would stay in the neighborhoods with an increase in mortgage 
supply. Those with a high school degree may be more likely to obtain a loan in these areas and \ 
stay when they would have otherwise left; this would force out those without a high school 
degree who would have otherwise stayed.  The estimate discontinuity in rate of individuals 25-
years of age and above who have a high school diploma, however, is small and insignificant 
which implies there was not a composition change (Figure7; Table 7).  In specifications with 
controls there is some evidence of an effect of CRA on the proportion of individuals above the 
age of 25 who have a college degree and live in these marginally targeted tracts.  In marginally 
treated tracts, CRA leads to approximately the same coefficient across all levels of precision, but 
without MSA fixed effects, the regression shows a much smaller increase in proportion of 
population having a college degree with the increase in mortgage credit (Figure 8).  CRA leads 
to a .75 percentage point increase in the proportion of individuals above 25 who have a 
Bachelor’s degree or above in the marginally treated tracts, which means that a 1% increase in 
originations leads to a 0.14 percentage point increase in the rate of individuals with a college 
degree (Table 8).  This increase could be due to a shift in savings.  Individuals above 25 years of 
age who live in marginally treated tracts are more able to refinance which frees up their savings 
to pay for a secondary education.  This increase in rate is only marginally significant.  These 
results should be taken with caution.  When this many variables are examined, it is more likely 
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that one of the variables will be found to be significant simply by chance.  If a more stringent test 
was used based on Bonferroni testing, for example, these coefficients would no longer be 
significant. Caution is also supported by the substantial variation in data points across the cutoff 
in Figure 8.  Since these results are only found to be marginally significant, more investigation 
would need to be conducted to ensure the robustness of these results. 
CRA has the potential to affect the employment rate, unemployment rate, and labor force 
participation rate.  There are no significant or large results for any of these variables across any 
variation in the degree of controls.  Employment may be expected to decrease when the number 
of originations increases.  If the homeownership rate increased, it is possible that this decreases 
the mobility of the individual; homeownership ties the owner down to a specific geographic area 
limiting the ability to leave to find work.  The employment rate would decrease and the 
unemployment rate would increase.  This would also be the case if the individual invested money 
to improve his or her home: the home value would go up and a person may be more obligated to 
stay thereby restraining their ability to leave to find work.  Employment without the MSA fixed 
effects was found to have a positive increase due to CRA and the increase in originations though 
the increases were insignificant (Figure 9).  Employment was found to decrease when fixed 
effects and then controls were added while unemployment increased in all specifications, though 
neither variable had a large or significant change (Table 9 & 10; Figure 10).  This effect could be 
due to individuals entering or leaving the labor force; but the labor force in marginal tracts, due 
to CRA and the increase in originations, had a fairly precise 0 change when MSA fixed effects 
were included (Table 11; Figure 11). 
An alternative explanation is that the commuting time of these individuals would increase 
allowing them to remain employed and minimize the effect of the mobility.  The commuting 
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time, however, decreased significantly (Table 12).  In marginal tracts that are treated for CRA, 
the proportion of individuals who commuted to work in 25 minutes or less and did not work at 
home increased by 0.8 percentage points when controls and MSA fixed effects were included; 
without controls or both of these factors, the effect was found to be insignificant. With a 1% 
increase, there was a .15 percentage point increase in the proportion of people who commuted to 
work in less than 25 minutes.  The effect is smaller but also marginally significant when neither 
controls nor fixed effects are included.  The increase in a shorter commuting time suggests that 
people in marginally treated tracts may have substituted away from using their savings on 
household improvements and home purchases and instead received home loans.  Substituting 
away from their savings for home investments left open the opportunity for individuals to use 
their savings on alternative large items such as a car.  This would explain the decrease in 
commuting time without a change in employment, mobility, or homeownership rates.  However 
this effect should be taken with caution, similar to the effect found for college degree attainment.  
Though the coefficient is found to be significant across the cutoff, there seem to be evident 
variation across cutoff not necessarily suggesting a robust discontinuity. 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
 The Community Reinvestment Act began as an effort to decrease redlining.  It 
encouraged the loans in areas that would typically be underserved.  Every institution covered 
under the FDIC is obligated to participate in CRA.  The banks work with community groups to 
create targets and generate lending in targeted areas.  There has been evidence in the past of an 
increase in the mortgage volume in targeted census tracts by CRA.  However, there has been 
little literature that examined the community outcome variables possibly affected by the increase 
in credit due to CRA.  This paper supports evidence that CRA increases mortgage lending in 
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certain areas, and expands the literature on the effect of the lending increase due to CRA on 
community outcome variables. 
Though no significant effect of lending is found in all MSAs, for large MSAs from 1994 
to 1999 in marginally treated tracts there is a 5.7% increase in mortgage originations in the full 
sample and a 5.4% increase in the mortgage originations in the sample of tracts that remained 
unchanged between 1990 and 2000.  These results prove to be fairly robust in both linear and 
polynomial regression discontinuities, with and without controls, and in different bins around the 
cutoff.  Furthermore, the total amount originated increases, while the average amount per 
origination stays the same. The lenders do not substitute away from the amount per origination to 
get more originations and keep the total amount originated the same.  Therefore, the total 
mortgage volume, both originations and amount originated increases.  Large MSAs demonstrate 
the greatest impact in mortgage originations.  The largest MSAs are believed to have a stricter 
punishment for not completing CRA obligations.  The regulators focus on the large MSAs to 
conserve resources and the banks are more likely to open banks and complete mergers in large 
MSAs therefore the punishment of regulators not accepting requests for new branches and 
mergers bears more weight.  Furthermore it is suggested, because there is not an effect found in 
these large MSAs for the average amount given per origination, there is an increase in mortgage 
volume in targeted tracts due to the number of originations not the amount of the originations. 
There is little evidence effect, however, found in the community outcome variables. An 
increase in homeownership may be expected in tracts with an increase in mortgage lending 
because more people have gained access to credit and could obtain loans.  Little evidence for an 
increase in the homeownership is found, however.  The number of originations includes home 
purchase, home improvement, and refinance loans making it difficult to discern whether people 
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are investing in a home or buying a new one.  It is not found however, that the self-reported 
home values increase in targeted areas.  Therefore, it is not specifically the type of originations 
that could cause a lack of increase in homeownership.   
Little evidence of a change in mobility rate is found, but there is evidence of a marginally 
significant change in the make-up of the neighborhood in the education factors.  There proved to 
be little turnover of individuals in these neighborhoods.  This indicates that CRA did not 
necessarily bring in a new set of people to change the composition of the tract.  Though college 
educational attainment changed slightly for the treated tracts, it could have been due to 
substituting savings for refinancing and therefore putting themselves through school.  This result 
should be taken with caution.  So many outcome variables are examined that it is likely that one 
or two will be marginally significant.  With a more stringent test, the significance does not hold 
up.  Employment factors were also potential subjects of CRA impact.  However, no effects are 
found on employment factors.  Commuting time does vary significantly due to the effect of CRA 
on the marginal tracts possibly indicating substituting away from savings and towards 
borrowing; again this result should be taken with caution.   
 Overall, I find that though CRA leads to an increase in originations, the increase in 
originations is not translated necessarily into community outcome variables.  It is difficult to 
indirectly influence community outcome variables through policy; a change in more than 5.4% in 
originations would most likely be needed in order to find an effect in community outcomes. 
Though limiting our sample to large MSAs focuses our efforts to areas with the most significant 
effect on the mortgage supply, this size increase in mortgage originations may not give us 
enough power to find a significant effect of mortgage supply increase on the community 
outcome variables.  
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The regression discontinuity, furthermore, only examined the effect of CRA mortgage 
lending in the marginal tracts at the CRA cutoff; there may be larger effects on the community 
outcome variables further from the cutoff.  It could also be plausible that looking at these 
marginal tracts measures the largest effect.  It is found GSEs focus their efforts directly below 
their target cutoff; these neighborhoods are the richest of the low-to-moderate income 
neighborhoods leading institutions to view them as the least risky (Bhutta, 2009).  However, 
further research should be conducted to see if this is true of the institutions under the regulation 
of the CRA who may not have as much choice between neighborhoods because they are limited 
to the census tracts in their assessment area, where the GSEs are able to pick and choose from 
census tracts throughout the country. 
Further investigation could also add to our understanding of which community outcomes 
could be affected.  Research should be expanded into looking at house prices, not just the self-
reported home values.  It is possible that different ends of the distribution of house prices may be 
affected, not just the median house price.  This could help explain what type of homebuyer 
lenders are targeting.  Changes in other community outcome variables as a result of CRA should 
be investigated as well.  CRA could lead to an influence on the education of individuals.  It could 
also lead to an influence on the crime rate in the area.  As DiPasquel and Glaser suggest, more 
lending to the area could lead to more investment into the area.  This investment could be in 
social capital of their children or keeping their streets safe.  The full implications of CRA are not 
yet examined.  Evidence has been provided that in marginally treated tracts CRA does lead to an 
increase in the number of originations and access to credit in tracts where the punishment and 
enforcement of punishment of CRA is rigorous.  Hopefully, this paper will motivate further 
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Discontinuity of Predicted Log of Bank Originations for Unchanged Tract Sample of Large MSA’s 
 
 
Note: The y-axis is the predicted log of originations estimated by a regression of log of originations 
between 1994 and 1999 on tract characteristics from the 1990 census without MSA fixed effects.  Each 
data point represents the mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of TM.  The data is 
only for the sample unchanged tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census with a TM between 0.5 and 
1.10.  The fitted lines are generated from a cubic regression of the predicted values on the CRA dummy 
variable (TMi<0.8), the GSE dummy variable (TMi<0.9), and the TM variable.  The coefficient shown is 
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Discontinuity of Log of Bank Originations for the Full Sample of Large MSAs  
 
 
Note: The y-axis is the log of originations between 1994 and 1999 for the full sample with a TM between 
0.5 and 1.10 .  Each data point represents the mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals 
of TM.  The fitted lines are generated from a cubic regression of the log of originations on the CRA 
dummy variable (TMi<0.8), the GSE dummy variable (TMi<0.9), and the TM variable without MSA 
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Discontinuity of Log of Bank Originations for the Unchanged tract of Large MSAs  
 
 
Note: The y-axis is the log of originations between 1994 and 1999 for the sample of unchanged tracts 
between the 1990 and 2000 Census with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10.  Each data point represents the mean 
tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of TM.  The fitted lines are generated from a cubic 
regression of the log of originations on the CRA dummy variable (TMi<0.8), the GSE dummy variable 
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Census tract characteristics 
from 1990 census 
N=23151 N=13038 N=4887 N=8151 
      
Tract Population 4406.707 4005.900 3837.293 4106.988 p<.01 
(2301.331) (1699.848) (1765.747) (1650.956) 
Total Housing Units 1812.388 1660.780 1591.259 1702.46 p<.01 
(988.6271) (751.2276) (768.3947) (737.6564) 
Owner Occupied Housing Units 977.5589 869.570 656.5181 997.3055 p<.01 
(629.8486) (488.6388) (422.1152) (481.2308) 
Median House Value 88737.68 91140.93 77690.48 99205.26 p<.01 
(63264.37) (67183.40) (63886.55) (67821.07) 
Prop. of 1 Detached Unit 0.5518 0.5308 0.4349 0.5883 p<.01 
(0.2687) (0.2861) (0.2883) (0.2689) 
Prop. of Multifamily Units 0.1847 0.1992 0.2376 0.1762 p<.01 
(0.2137) (0.2255) (0.2485) (0.2071) 
Prop. of Mobile or Trailer Homes 0.0641 0.0508 0.0447 0.0545 p<.01 
(0.1188) (0.1076) (0.1114) (0.1050) 
      






















    











      











      











      
Prop. of Persons 65+ 0.1335 0.1361 0.1300 0.1398 p<.01 
(0.0751) (0.0742) (0.0768) (0.0725) 
      
Prop. in Group Quarters 0.0161 0.0152 0.0172 0.0141 p<.01 
(0.0358) (0.0345) (0.0363) (0.0333) 
      
 
Note: This table shows the mean (standard deviation) for the census tract characteristics taken from the 
1990 Census Neighborhood Change Database released by Geolytics.  Both the full sample and the 
unchanged tracts are only for 0.5<TMi<1.10.  Columns 3 and 4, 0.5<=TMi<0.80 and 0.8<TMi<1.10 
















Banks and Thrifts - HMDA 
Characteristics 
N=23151 N=13038 N=4887 N=8151 
 
      






















      
Mortgage Outcome Variables N=23151 N=13038 N=4887 N=8151 
      
Log of Total Originations 5.7228 5.6064 5.2451 5.823 p<.01 
 (0.8690) (0.8265) (0.8319) (0.7435)  
      











      











      
Community Outcome Variables   N=13038 N=4887 N=8151  
      
Homeownership Rate in 2000  0.5807 0.4944 0.6474 p<.01 
  (0.2234) (0.2114) (0.2029) 
      









  N=12934 N=4817 N=8117 
Mobility Rate  0.4565 0.4865 0.4385 p<.01 
  (0.1219) (0.1264) (0.1155) 
  
   
 
Employment-to-Population of 








      









      
Labor Force Participation Rate of 



















Proportion With a High School 









Proportion With a College 








      
 
Note: This table shows the mean (standard deviation) for the types of originations and the mortgage 
outcome variables taken from HMDA summed for each tract across 1994-1999 and the community 
outcome variables taken from the 2000 Census Neighborhood Change Database released by Geolytics.  
Both the full sample and the unchanged tracts are only for 0.5<TMi<1.10.  Columns 3 and 4, 




Table 2 a  
Regression of Log of Originations on CRA Treatment – Full Sample 
Dependent Variable: Log of Originations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
All MSAS 0.0804 0.0320 -0.0116 0.0011 0.0369 0.0146 0.0166 
mean 5.6692  (0.7933) (0.0574) (0.0420) (0.0226) (0.0181) (0.0318) (0.0263) (0.0138) 
N=4268 N=4268 N=23151 N=23151 N=23151 N=23151 N=23151 
        
Small MSAs -0.0644 -0.1295 -0.0581 -0.0211 -0.0365 -0.0281 -0.0024 
mean 5.7516  (0.7191) (0.0915) (0.0999) (0.0143) (0.0366) (0.0541) (0.0490) (0.0284) 
N=1130 N=1130 N=6358 N=6358 N=6358 N=6358 N=6358 
        
Medium MSAs 0.1447* 0.1223* -0.0344 -0.0235 0.0208 0.0150 -0.0183 
mean 5.7063  (0.7314) (0.0759) (0.0707) (0.0378) (0.0364) (0.0511) (0.0512) (0.0245) 
N=1474 N=1474 N=7869 N=7869 N=7869 N=7869 N=7869 
        
Large MSAs 0.1182 0.0433 0.0406 0.0387* 0.0943* 0.0425 0.0573**** 
mean 5.5794  (0.8843) (0.1123) (0.0609) (0.0367) (0.0202) (0.0504) (0.0373) (0.0147) 
N=1664 N=1664 N=8924 N=8924 N=8924 N=8924 N=8924 
MSA FE x x x x 
Full Controls x 
Bandwidth 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for linear linear linear linear cubic cubic cubic 
        
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients from the full sample for the regression of log of originations on the dummy for treated by the CRA.   *p-
value < 0.1, **p-value <0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, ****p-value<0.005  All of the regressions control for the potential effects of the GSE  policy 
(TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.  Each of the mean in italics is given is for the area directly above the cutoff 
(0.8<TMi<0.82).  Small MSAs have a population of less than 500,000 people; medium MSAs have a population between 500,000 and 2 million 








Table 2 b  
Regression on Log of Originations – Sample of Unchanged Tracts 
Dependent Variable: Log of Originations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
All MSAS 0.1242* 0.0798 0.0053 0.0143 0.0324 0.0002 0.0187 
mean  5.5370  (0.7758) (0.0664) (0.0504) (0.0312) (0.0247) (0.04631) (0.0321) (0.0176) 
N=2493 N=2493 N=13038 N=13038 N=13038 N=13038 N=13038 
        
Small MSAs -0.0192 0.0134 -0.0080 0.0290 -0.0225 -0.0219 0.0225 
mean  5.7125  (0.6461) (0.1197) (0.1570) (0.0510) (.0490) (0.0719) (0.0637) (0.0334) 
N=621 N=621 N=3301 N=3301 N=3301 N=3301 N=3301 
        
Medium MSAs 0.1321 0.0620 -0.0571 -0.0435 -0.0554 -0.0587 -0.0299 
mean  5.6078  (0.6904) (0.1061) (0.1011) (0.0565) (0.0536) (0.0696) (0.0675) (0.0347) 
N=843 N=843 N=4341 N=4341 N=4341 N=4341 N=4341 
        
Large MSAs 0.1994* 0.1168** 0.0689** 0.0557* 0.1357* 0.0571 0.0545*** 
mean  5.3676  (0.8804) (0.0997) (.1168) (0.0468) (.0256) (0.0716) (0.0377) (0.0177) 
N=1029 N=1029 N=5396 N=5396 N=5396 N=5396 N=5396 
MSA FE x x x x 
Full Controls x 
Bandwidth 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for linear linear linear linear cubic cubic cubic 
        
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients from the sample of unchanged tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census for the regression of log of 
originations on the dummy for treated by the CRA.   *p-value < 0.1, **p-value <0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, ****p-value<0.005  All of the 
regressions control for the potential effects of the GSE  policy (TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.  Each of the mean 
in italics is given is for the area directly above the cutoff (0.8<TMi<0.82).  Small MSAs have a population of less than 500,000 people; medium 
MSAs have a population between 500,000 and 2 million people; large MSAs have a population of more than 2 million people according to the 









Table 3 a 
Regression on Log of Total Amount ($) Originated – Sample of Unchanged Tracts 
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Dollar Amount Originated 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
All MSAS 0.0839 0.0499 0.0090 0.0136 -0.0096 -0.0191 0.0033 
mean  8.6556  (0.8759) (0.0667) (0.0669) (0.0323) (0.0265) (0.0421) (0.0336) (0.0250) 
N=2490 N=2490 N=13024 N=13024 N=13024 N=13024 N=13024 
        
Small MSAs 0.0443 -0.0111 0.0223 0.0362 -0.0036 -0.0345 0.0143 
mean  8.5954  (0.8169) (0.1467) (0.1612) (0.0632) (0.0511) (0.0901) (0.0649) (0.0447) 
N=621 N=621 N=3301 N=3301 N=3301 N=3301 N=3301 
        
Medium MSAs 0.0012*** -0.0236 -0.0747 -0.0492 -0.1316* -0.1063 -0.0803* 
mean  8.6532  (0.7970) (0.1388) (0.1174) (0.0684) (0.0594) (0.0763) (0.0681) (0.0431) 
N=842 N=842 N=4340 N=4340 N=4340 N=4340 N=4340 
        
Large MSAs 0.1683** 0.1255 0.0526 0.0531* 0.0845* 0.0566 0.0610* 
mean  8.6952  (0.9713) (0.0715) (0.1006) (0.0355) (0.0292) (0.0481) (0.0448) (0.0328) 
N=1027 N=1027 N=5383 N=5383 N=5383 N=5383 N=5383 
MSA FE x x x x 
Full Controls x 
Bandwidth 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for linear linear linear linear cubic cubic cubic 
        
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients from the sample of unchanged tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census for the regression of log of total 
dollar amount originated in each tract on the dummy for treated by the CRA.   *p-value < 0.1, **p-value <0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, ****p-
value<0.005  All of the regressions control for the potential effects of the GSE  policy (TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are clustered at the MSA 
level.  Each of the mean in italics is given is for the area directly above the cutoff (0.8<TMi<0.82).  Small MSAs have a population of less than 
500,000 people; medium MSAs have a population between 500,000 and 2 million people; large MSAs have a population of more than 2 million 








Table 3 b 
Regression on Log of Average Amount ($) per Origination – Sample of Unchanged Tracts 
Dependent Variable: Log of Average Dollar Amount per Origination 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
All MSAS -0.0300 -0.0208 -0.0019 0.0001 -0.0482 -0.0243 -0.0183 
mean  3.1185  (0.5236) (0.0510) (0.0336) (0.0237) (0.0174) (0.0298) (0.0160) (0.0165) 
N=2490 N=2490 N=13024 N=13024 N=13024 N=13024 N=13024 
        
Small MSAs 0.0634 0.0245 0.0304 0.007 0.0189 -0.0125 -0.0083 
mean  2.8829  (0.3929) (0.0735) (0.0556) (0.0299) (0.0192) (0.0431) (0.0260) (0.0264) 
N=621 N=621 N=3301 N=3301 N=3301 N=3301 N=3301 
        
Medium MSAs -0.1137* -0.0680* -0.0254 0.0140 -0.0871** -0.0598** -0.0592** 
mean  3.0454  (0.4233) (0.0667) (0.0390) (0.0302) (0.0219) (0.0380) (0.0250) (0.0233) 
N=842 N=842 N=4340 N=4340 N=4340 N=4340 N=4340 
        
Large MSAs -0.0211 0.0148 -0.0047 0.0059 -0.0568 -0.0026 0.0057 
mean  3.3276  (0.5896) (0.0889) (0.0633) (0.0471) (0.0368) (0.0498) (0.0308) (0.0314) 
N=1027 N=1027 N=5383 N=5383 N=5383 N=5383 N=5383 
MSA FE x x x x 
Full Controls x 
Bandwidth 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for linear linear linear linear cubic cubic cubic 
        
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients from the sample of unchanged tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census for the regression of log of 
average dollar amount per origination in each tract on the dummy for treated by the CRA.   *p-value < 0.1, **p-value <0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, 
****p-value<0.005  All of the regressions control for the potential effects of the GSE  policy (TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are clustered at the 
MSA level.  Each of the mean in italics is given is for the area directly above the cutoff (0.8<TMi<0.82).  Small MSAs have a population of less 
than 500,000 people; medium MSAs have a population between 500,000 and 2 million people; large MSAs have a population of more than 2 




Homeownership for Large MSA’s 
Mean 0.4959 (0.2327) 
Reduced Form IV 
 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] ln(orig) ln(orig) ln(orig)
       
0.0316** 0.0082 0.0001 0.2329*** 0.1440 0.0019 
(0.0145) (0.0100) (.0039) (0.0797) (0.1687) (.0702) 
N 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 
R^2 0.1880 0.4149 0.9067 0.3515 0.5538 0.9072 
MSA FE  x x  x x 
Full Controls  x  x 
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
       
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients for the regression of proportion of all occupied units that are 
owner-occupied units on the CRA dummy variable (reduced form) and log of originations instrument for 
the CRA dummy (IV).  The homeownership rate is taken from the 2000 Census. The coefficients show 
are from the sample of large MSAs with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10 in unchanged tracts between the 
1990 and 2000 Census.  *p-value < 0.1, **p-value <0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, ****p-value<0.005  All of 
the regressions control for the potential effects of the GSE  policy (TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are 




Discontinuity of Homeownership for Large MSAs 
 
 
Note: The y-axis is the homeownership rate with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10.  Each data point represents 
the mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of TM. The fitted lines are generated from 
a cubic regression of the log of originations on the CRA dummy variable (TMi<0.8), the GSE dummy 
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Log of Self-Reported Home Values 
Mean 11.8552 (0.5018) 
Reduced Form IV 
 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] ln(orig) ln(orig) ln(orig) 
       
-0.0618 -0.0033 0.0001 -0.4819 -0.0810 0.0169 
0.0420 (0.0140) (0.0123) (0.3059) (0.3669) (0.3044)
N 5310 5310 5310 5310 5310 5310 
R^2 0.0703 0.6273 0.7814    
MSA FE  x x  x x 
Full Controls  x  x 
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
       
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients for the regression of log of median home values on the CRA 
dummy variable (reduced form) and log of originations instrument for the CRA dummy (IV).  The 
median home values are taken from the 2000 Census. The coefficients show are from the sample of large 
MSAs with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10 in unchanged tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census.  *p-value 
< 0.1, **p-value <0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, ****p-value<0.005  All of the regressions control for the 
potential effects of the GSE  policy (TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are clustered at the MSA levels.  
The mean (in italics) is given is for the tracts directly above the cutoff (0.8<TMi<0.82).  
 
Figure 5 
Discontinuity of Log of Median Home Values for Large MSAs 
 
Note: The y-axis is the log of median home values with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10.  Each data point 
represents the mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of TM.  The fitted lines are 
generated from a cubic regression of the log of originations on the CRA dummy variable (TMi<0.8), the 
GSE dummy variable (TMi<0.9), and the TM variable without MSA fixed effects shown in column 1 in 
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Mean 0.4614 (0.1232) 
Reduced Form IV 
 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] ln(orig) ln(orig) ln(orig) 
       
0.0024 -0.0006 0.0067 0.0176 -0.011 0.1229 
(0.0109) (0.0097) (0.0058) (0.0770) (0.1683) (0.1229)
N 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 
R^2 0.0343 0.2765 0.6499 0.0272 0.2864 0.5377 
MSA FE  x x  x x 
Full Controls  x  x 
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
       
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients for the regression of mobility on the CRA dummy variable 
(reduced form) and log of originations instrument for the CRA dummy (IV).  Mobility is defined by the 
degree of turnover in the tract by looking at the share of the population ages 5+ who lived in a different 
tract 5 years previously on the 2000 Census.  The coefficients show are from the sample of large MSAs 
with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10 in unchanged tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census.  *p-value < 0.1, 
**p-value <0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, ****p-value<0.005  All of the regressions control for the potential 
effects of the GSE  policy (TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are clustered at the MSA levels. The mean (in 
italics) is given is for the tracts directly above the cutoff (0.8<TMi<0.82).  
 
Figure 6 
Discontinuity of Mobility for Large MSAs 
 
Note: The y-axis is the mobility rate with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10.  Each data point represents the 
mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of TM. The fitted lines are generated from a 
cubic regression of the log of originations on the CRA dummy variable (TMi<0.8), the GSE dummy 
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Proportion of Individuals with High School Diploma 
Mean 0.2838 (0.0883) 
Reduced Form IV 
 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] ln(orig) ln(orig) ln(orig) 
       
-0.0026 -0.0062 -0.0049 -0.0195 -0.1089 -0.089 
(0.0058) (0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0426) (0.1122) (0.0712)
N 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 
R^2 .0207 0.3616 0.5936   0.5016 
MSA FE  x x  x x 
Full Controls  x  x 
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
       
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients for the regression of the proportion of individuals 25+ with a 
High School Diploma on the CRA dummy variable (reduced form) and log of originations instrument for 
the CRA dummy (IV).  The proportion of individuals with a High School Diploma is taken from the 2000 
Census. The coefficients show are from the sample of large MSAs with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10 in 
unchanged tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census.  *p-value < 0.1, **p-value <0 .05, ***p-
value<0.01, ****p-value<0.005  All of the regressions control for the potential effects of the GSE  policy 
(TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are clustered at the MSA levels.  The mean (in italics) is given is for the 
tracts directly above the cutoff (0.8<TMi<0.82).  
 
Figure 7 
Discontinuity of Proportion of High School Degree Earners for Large MSAs 
 
Note: The y-axis is the proportion of individuals 25+ with a high school degree with a TM between 0.5 
and 1.10.  Each data point represents the mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of 
TM. The fitted lines are generated from a cubic regression of the log of originations on the CRA dummy 
variable (TMi<0.8), the GSE dummy variable (TMi<0.9), and the TM variable without MSA fixed effects 
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Proportion of Individuals with College Degree 
Mean 0.1912 (0.1291) 
Reduced Form IV 
 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] ln(orig) ln(orig) ln(orig) 
       
0.0073 0.0074 0.0075* 0.0535 0.1289 0.1373* 
(0.0069) (0.0061) (0.0036) (0.0628) (0.1500) (0.0690)
N 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 
R^2 0.1063 0.2271 0.5479   0.4956 
MSA FE  x x  x x 
Full Controls  x  x 
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
       
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients for the regression of the proportion of individuals 25+ with a 
College Degree (Bachelors and above) on the CRA dummy variable (reduced form) and log of 
originations instrument for the CRA dummy (IV).  The proportion of individuals with a College Degree is 
taken from the 2000 Census. The coefficients show are from the sample of large MSAs with a TM 
between 0.5 and 1.10 in unchanged tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census.  *p-value < 0.1, **p-value 
<0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, ****p-value<0.005  All of the regressions control for the potential effects of the 
GSE  policy (TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are clustered at the MSA levels.  The mean (in italics) is 
given is for the tracts directly above the cutoff (0.8<TMi<0.82).  
 
Figure 8 
Discontinuity of Proportion of College Degree Earners for Large MSAs 
 
Note: The y-axis is the proportion of individuals 25+ with a college degree with a TM between 0.5 and 
1.10.  Each data point represents the mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of TM.  
The fitted lines are generated from a cubic regression of the log of originations on the CRA dummy 
variable (TMi<0.8), the GSE dummy variable (TMi<0.9), and the TM variable without MSA fixed effects 
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Mean 0.5742  (0.0908) 
 Reduced Form IV 
 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] ln(orig) ln(orig) ln(orig) 
       
0.0039 -0.0012 -0.0011 0.0285 -0.0207 -0.0196 
 (0.0088) (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0529) (0.1105) (0.0993)
N 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 
R^2 0.1813 0.3792 0.6417 0.2569 0.3463 0.6197 
MSA FE  x x  x x 
Full Controls  x  x 
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
       
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients for the regression of the proportion of the total population of 
civilians 16+ who are employed on the CRA dummy variable (reduced form) and log of originations 
instrument for the CRA dummy (IV).  The employed-to-population ratio is taken from the 2000 Census. 
The coefficients show are from the sample of large MSAs with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10 in unchanged 
tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census.  *p-value < 0.1, **p-value <0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, ****p-
value<0.005  All of the regressions control for the potential effects of the GSE  policy (TMi<0.90).  The 
standard errors are clustered at the MSA levels.  The mean (in italics) is given is for the tracts directly 
above the cutoff (0.8<TMi<0.82).  
 
Figure 9 
Discontinuity of Employment to Population Ratio for Large MSAs 
 
Note: The y-axis is the employment to population with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10.  Each data point 
represents the mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of TM. The fitted lines are 
generated from a cubic regression of the log of originations on the CRA dummy variable (TMi<0.8), the 
GSE dummy variable (TMi<0.9), and the TM variable without MSA fixed effects shown in column 1 in 
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Mean 0.0772  (0.0474) 
 Reduced Form IV 
 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] ln(orig) ln(orig) ln(orig) 
       
0.0001 0.0024 0.001 0.0007 0.042 0.0175 
(0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0296) (0.0687) (0.0528)
N 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 
R^2 0.2702 0.3923 0.5574 0.2649 0.0517 0.5226 
MSA FE  x x  x x 
Full Controls  x  x 
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
       
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients for the regression of the proportion of the civilian labor force 
16+ who are unemployed on the CRA dummy variable (reduced form) and log of originations instrument 
for the CRA dummy (IV).  The unemployment rate is taken from the 2000 Census. The coefficients show 
are from the sample of large MSAs with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10 in unchanged tracts between the 
1990 and 2000 Census.  *p-value < 0.1, **p-value <0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, ****p-value<0.005  All of 
the regressions control for the potential effects of the GSE  policy (TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are 




Discontinuity of Unemployment Rate for Large MSAs 
 
Note: The y-axis is the unemployment rate with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10.  Each data point represents 
the mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of TM.  The fitted lines are generated from 
a cubic regression of the log of originations on the CRA dummy variable (TMi<0.8), the GSE dummy 
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Labor Force Participation Rate 
Mean 0.6205  (0.0816) 
 Reduced Form IV 
 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] ln(orig) ln(orig) ln(orig) 
       
0.0046 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0336 0.011 -0.0021 
(0.0080) (0.0060) (0.0049) (0.0471) (0.1044) (0.0897)
N 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 
R^2 0.1099 0.2893 0.5977 .1714 0.2919 0.5957 
MSA FE  x x  x x 
Full Controls  x  x 
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
       
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients for the regression of the proportion of the total population of 
civilians 16+ who participate in the labor force on the CRA dummy variable (reduced form) and log of 
originations instrument for the CRA dummy (IV).  The labor force participation rate is taken from the 
2000 Census. The coefficients show are from the sample of large MSAs with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10 
in unchanged tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census.  *p-value < 0.1, **p-value <0 .05, ***p-
value<0.01, ****p-value<0.005  All of the regressions control for the potential effects of the GSE  policy 
(TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are clustered at the MSA levels.  The mean (in italics) is given is for the 
tracts directly above the cutoff (0.8<TMi<0.82).  
 
Figure 11 
Discontinuity of Labor Force Participation Rate for Large MSAs  
 
Note: The y-axis is the labor force participation rate with a TM between 0.5 and 1.10.  Each data point 
represents the mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of TM. The fitted lines are 
generated from a cubic regression of the log of originations on the CRA dummy variable (TMi<0.8), the 
GSE dummy variable (TMi<0.9), and the TM variable without MSA fixed effects shown in column 1 in 

























.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 1.1




Proportion of Employed with Commuting Time <25 minutes 
Mean 0.2610  (0.1090) 
 Reduced Form IV 
 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] 1[TM<.8] ln(orig) ln(orig) ln(orig) 
       
0.0110 0.0050 0.0082** 0.0807* 0.0870 0.1502* 
(0.0088) (0.0046) (0.0036) (0.0427) (0.0931) (0.0798)
N 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 5396 
R^2 0.0689 0.5240 0.6400 0.1216 0.2498 0.3770 
MSA FE  x x  x x 
Full Controls  x  x 
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Control for cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic 
       
 
Note: This table supplies the coefficients for the regression of the proportion of working civilians 16+ 
who are commute to work in under 25 minutes and do not work at home on the CRA dummy variable 
(reduced form) and log of originations instrument for the CRA dummy (IV).  The commuting time rate is 
taken from the 2000 Census. The coefficients show are from the sample of large MSAs with a TM 
between 0.5 and 1.10 in unchanged tracts between the 1990 and 2000 Census.  *p-value < 0.1, **p-value 
<0 .05, ***p-value<0.01, ****p-value<0.005  All of the regressions control for the potential effects of the 
GSE  policy (TMi<0.90).  The standard errors are clustered at the MSA levels.  The mean (in italics) is 
given is for the tracts directly above the cutoff (0.8<TMi<0.82).  
 
Figure 12 
Discontinuity of Commuting Time for Large MSAs  
 
Note: The y-axis is the proportion of employed commuting time 25 min or less with a TM between 0.5 
and 1.10.  Each data point represents the mean tract values for tracts for 1 percentage point intervals of 
TM. The fitted lines are generated from a cubic regression of the log of originations on the CRA dummy 
variable (TMi<0.8), the GSE dummy variable (TMi<0.9), and the TM variable without MSA fixed effects 
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